Economic forces facing the bank holding company movement by Darryl R. Francis
Economic Forces Facing the Rank Holding
Company Movement
An Address by DARRYL R. FRANCIS, President, Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis, at the BAI Conference on
Bank Holding Company Administration, Chicago, Illinois, August 16, 1974
IT IS good to have this opportunity to discuss with
you some thoughts on the economic forces facing
bank holding companies. The bank holding company
movement is of increasing interest to both the eco-
nomic and the political sectors of our society. Bank
holding companies own about one-fourth of the na-
tion’s banks which, in turn, hold about two-thirds of
the banking assets. In addition, they have made sub-
stantial inroads in a number of bank-related activities.
Most of the bank holding company growth occurred
during the past decade. From 1963 to 1973, the mini-
her of multiple bank holding companies rose five-fold,
and the number of one-bank holding companies dou-
bled from 1968 to 1973.
The rapid increase in bank holding companies can
be traced to the restrictions on commercial banking.
In a competitive market, the type of firm or structure
which evolves is that which tends to maximize both
profits and consumer well-being. The incentive for
profit provides the motivation for banks to fill any
voids in their markets. When they observe opportuni-
ties to increase services and profits by a change in
structure, they will attempt to make such a change.
TITh i/VOl ITHON OF IIF•GULATION
The formation of a bank holding company can be
looked upon as a way whereby many restrictions on
commercial banks can be overcome and services to
the public expanded. In recent years branching restric-
tions have become increasingly onerous to banks lo-
cated in declimiing central cities of unit banking states.
Regulation Q has also been more burdensome to banks
in the more competitive banking markets with the
rising imitercst rates. Bank holding companies permit
banks to expand their operations into mtew geographic
mnarkets through the orgauizatiomi of new firms or
through the purchase of existing firms where branches
of the parent firm are proinbited, As evidence that
holding companies are used to bypass restrictions on
individual banks, the multi-hank holding company
movement is much more pronounced imi unit banking
states. For example, in 1972 there was less than 2
mnulti-bank holding companies per state in the 18
state-wide branching states which permitted multi-
hank holding companies. In contrast, there was 12 per
state in the 8 nut banking states which permitted
multi-bank holding companies.
Bank.s’
Regulation of banks has proceeded without a clear
recognition of what svas to be regulated. Most of the
restrictions have come about since the early l930s as
a result of confusion as to the cause of economic
instability.
In the early years of the nation, commercial bank
regulation was largely concerned with the chartering
provisions for state banks, their bank note (paper
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money) issuing function, and the impact of such is-
sues on the economy. There was little interest in the
maintenance of sound banks as long as they could
redeem their paper money with specie.
That sage of American politics, Thomas Jefferson,
and a number of political leaders who followed, rec-
ognized that the restrictions on banking should be
directed at the quantity and quality of money rather
than other functions of financial firms. Albert Callatin,
Jefferson’s Secretary of the Treasury, contended that
the creation (If hank money should be restrained; but
with that single exception, banks should be left free
as any other firm. President Jackson in his farewell
address in 1837 said that corporations which create
paper money cannot be relied on to maintain a uni-
form amount,
The National Banking Act (1863) focused largely
on time quantity and quahty of mommy. A maximum
was placed on national bank note issues, and the
stock of money (deposits plus notes) was restricted
by legal reserverequirements.
While its general focus was on the protection and
control of money, the Act contained some provisions
for protecting banking firms. It prohibited some bank-
ing practices which were considered risky, such as
real estate lcmmdimig. It also provided for a sin-plus imi
capital accounts and the examination of all national
banks.
The chief objective of examination following time
Act was to make sure that the condition of banks
would enable them to redeem their notes. In the late
lSOOs, however, the Comptroller of the Currency
adopted the view that the correction of basic man-
agerial difficulties was also a function of bank
supervision.
The original Federal Reserve Act (1913), while not
specifically requiring that individual banks be main-
tained in a sound and viable condition, indicated that
this was an important supervisory objective. For ex-
ample, in acting upon membership applications, the
Act required that the financial condition and the gen-
eral character of the applying bank’s management be
considered.
Following the great depression and the rash of bank
failures in the early 1930s the Covemment began to
take greater responsibility for the maintenance of
strong, viable banks. Bank failure was associatedl with
economic instability and the view developed that
banks cannot be ailosved to fail for so-called public
interest reasons. This view led to the onerous bank
regulations in the llanking acts of 1933 and 1935
which sustain modern bank supervision. Thereafter,
banking activities, rather than the quamitity amid quality’
of money, consistently received the major focus of
bank regulatiomi.
The control of hank assets amid the maintenance of
sound banks has becomne a parammmusmmit simncrvisorv
objective. For example, before admitting banks to the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), their
future earnings prospects, adequacy of capital, and
character of management, as sve]i as the convenience
amid needs of the community, mtmst be considered. The
Comptroller comisiders the same factors before grant-
ing charters, thus, in effect, givimig time Federal
Covermmmcnt power to limit the miumnber of ilanking
firms.
The Acts require that eaelm Federal Reserve Bank
ascertain whether hank credit is being used for pur-
poses inconsistent with ‘sound credit conditions, If
sue-h unacceptable use is niade of bank credit, the
Federal Reserve Board may suspend a member bank
from the use of tie credit facilities of the System.
These Acts placed increased restrictions on the es-
tablisimment and operation of branches, The payment
of interest on demand deposits was prolnbited and
maximum rates were set on time and savings deposits
by the supervisory agencies. The Acts set limnits to the
bank’s investhients in its premises, divorced banking
from security dealing, and set restrictions on loans to
banking affiliates, dividemids payable, and bank capi-
tal. The Federal Reserve Board and the Comptroller
of the Curremiey were authorized to remove bank of-
ficials for illegal or unsound bank practices. Tlus leg-
islation, in effect, limited the bank managerial func-
tion to those actions consistent with the regulators’
view that banks should always remain in condition
to withstand another great depression. Furthermnore,
llank iegisiation and regulatiomi by individual states
during this period was often inure restrictive than
at the Federal level.
Ba:nk .ilcii..ums.F conm.paa.i.es
Until recently bank holding companies were sub-
ject to relatively few restrictions. State banking of-
ficials have generally found it dlifficuit to gain much
control over such companies.
The first Federal regulation of ilank holding com-
panics occurred with the Banking Act of 1933. Timis
Act provided the Federal Reserve Board with some
control over the voting of member bank stock owned
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by corporations. It required such corporations to
establish certaimi reserves, to pulllish financial state-
ments, and to withdrasv from the securities business.
Following the rapid growth of bank lmoiding com-
pamues after %Vorld War II, Congress emmaeted the Bank
Flolding Company Act of 1956. This law restricted
multiple bank holding c-omnpany activities to banking
and closely related services, and, witim minor excep-
tions, forced them to divest themselves of ownership
or control of any other kind of business. It limited
most acquisitions of bank stock by such companies to
the state in which their operations ivere principally
conducted, thereby effectively curbing new immterstate
bank acquisitions. The Act was amended in 1966 so
as to require prior approval of the Federal Reserve
Board for future acquisitions by bank holding
companies.
One-hank holding companies, however, were sub-
ject to less Federal control, and their number almost
doubled from 1968 to 1970. As a consequence of this
rapid growtii, some bankers, the regulators, and others
who were fearful of these new competitors -called for
their regulation. The Bank I-biding Company Amend-
ments of 1970 were passed, endhing the exemptiomi (If
one-bank holding companies from Federal control.
The Amendments did, however, liberalize time activi-
ties in which bank holding eompamues could partici-
pate. They were pernutted to acquire nonbank firms
across state lines.
Ri/GUI •ATiON /jy~) (~:()i’4’11/’fTfTlfjN•
As a consequemiee of the onerous restrictions on
banking amid bank holding companies, the quality and
efficiency of financial services have declined, amid tie
competitiveness of the banking system has been re-
duced. As pointed out by the Hunt Commnission, the
interest rate regulations (luring the period (If “tight”
money in 1970 made it increasingly difficult for bank
supervisors to accomplish their objectives of maintain-
ing strong, viable firms, and at the same time de-
creased the role and effectiveness of the institutions
they aimed to preserve. The regulations which pro-
hibited banks from paying a mnarket rate of interest
to savers actually weakened the banks as savings
were witlmdrawmi amid placed in higher-yielding invest-
ments. More importantly, however, savers, borrowers,
and consumners were bearing unnecessary risks and
costs.
In contrast to time controls on banks and bank hold-
ing companies, nonbanking firms enjoy rights of entry
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and flexibility in tie introduction of new financial
products and services miot enjoyed by either banks or
bank holding companies. Furthermore, as pointed out
in a recemtt study by the First National City Bank,
New York, some of these nonbank firms are relatively
large credit suppliers. Three nonbamik installment lend-
ers have receivallles outstamidhing equal to 11 percent
of the total Imeld by all commercial banks, amid one
has more receivables than the c-omhlined total for all
commercial bammks in New York and Clmieago. It is not
my intention to criticize these firms, hut only to sug-
gest that they saw business opportunities and entered
the finauciai services market to the advantage (If botlm
the finn and the comisumer.
In my view the public is entitled to the best and
lowest cost financial service that time market can pro-
vide. Competition in providing such service is the
best means of achieving thus oojeetive. lInt not all
hankers are eager to participate in a freely comnpeti-
tive market. Some, probabiy reflecting their overly
protected stattms, have not always beemi awake to their
opportumtmes amid challenges. Tlmey are miot unanimous
imm their support of the, Achministratiomm’s efforts to re—
move sonic of the regulatory shackles to vigorous
competitive operatiomis. They are often blind to a
competitor when it is called by’ some namne other than
a bamik. But time very fact that mmonbank competitors,
such as time Farm Credit Banks. sales finance com-
panies, savings and loan associations, and tile credit
departmnents of retail stores, have entered the finance
business amid aelmieved vigorous gromvtim indicates timat
commercial banks have heft voids iii the financial
services mam-ket. The assets of these nonbank financial
firms increased more than ten-fold from 1946 to 1972,
and their share of the total limiancial services market
rose from 43 to 62 percent.
The Humit Comnmnissiomi recogmuzed the excessive reg-
ulation of banks, amid proposed cimamiges that would
free themn fromn many controls. Its proposals inchided:
the relaxatiorm of interest rate restrictions, the removal
of mnost usury- eeihmigs on loans, the remnovai of limnita-
tions on ilramichm bamikimmg, arid the relaxatiomi of char—
tering and investment restrictions. The Comniission
recogmzedh that the pubiie would be better served
by the im’mcreased competition resultimig from the im-
plementatiomi of time proposals. Ia mnot here to pro-
mote any specific piami for restructuring the fimiancial
system, but rather to point out the economic forces
facing the bank hoidirmg company movement. \Yith
this background, I believe those forces are now
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OF GRFDIT
The demamid for financial services is growing, and
bank holding companies have tie organization and
the technical know-how to supply them. Competitive
challenges abound which they are inhibited from
meeting. However, if lmistory is a reliable teacher they
will have to fight for the opportunity to participate
in such markets as an equal. Their opponents in tie
struggle for ami equal opportunity to participate can
be classified into two groups. First are those pohtically
powerful sectors of the economy that demand pre-
ferred treatment in the credit allocation process. Sec-
ond are the regulators of finaneiah firms and tieir
supporters, who include those current participants in
the markets who fear comupetitiomi. And third is a
large segment of tie popnhatiomi which believes that
strong, viable financial firms camm be mnaimitained only
by restrictimig their mmatural incentive to compete.
Much of time impetus for preferential treatmemit in
the allocation of credit hias occurred during periods
of economic depressiomis or high nominal interest
rates. When market rates exceed limits established by
usury laws and Regulation Q, credit flows are diverted
from normal patterns. These market barriers have
tended to starve some sectors.
Numerous Covernment credit subsidy programs
hiave been established to “correct” these assumed de-
fects in tie credit market and the numnher of suelm
programs continues to grow. A staff study by the
Joint Eeonomnic Committee of the Congress mm 1972
listed 42 major Federal ercchit subsidy programs (those
with outstanding credit of more than 510 million).
Timese pm’ogramiis. designed to fim’mammce agrietmiture, cdii-
cation, housing, commerce, ecomiomic development,
nattiral resources, amid mnedieal care, cost the taxpayers
of the nation $4.2 billion in 1970. At the chose of 1972
direct government loans ontstanding through tmese
programs were estimated to be $56 billion and the
guaranteed loans $167 billion. In addition to these 42
major programs, there are mmnnierous subsidized credit
programs with less than $10 million credit outstanding.
These programs provide preferred treatmneimt for
some activities at the expense of others since the total
volume of credit available is not imicreased much, if
any. They divert credit flows from more produc-
tive uses to those uses selected through the political
process. They neither add to national well-being nor
the well-being of most of those sectors that they pur-
port to help. To the extent that they are successful
imi increasimig credit flows imito omme sector, they cause
excesses of resources in that sector relative to other
sectors. If welfare of tue imidlividltmai is thieir objective,
such welfare can be purchased at a much lower cost
through cash grants. Furthermore, such programs are
extremehy biased against those imidividuals who have
already obtained their credit or (Ither resources at
mnarket prices.
Of greater eommcermi to bamikers, ho\vever, should be
time cncroachmnemit of such activities in the fimiancial
markets. These programns- are hlased on the false premn-
ise that our financial system is doing a poor job of
aHocatimig credit. Yet, instead of poimmting out the ef-
fieiemicy of the free market system, and demam’mdhing
eqtmai opportumuties to mnarkets, bankers have ofterm
stood idly by or evemi assistedi imi the proliferatiomi of
credit markets by these privileged agencies. Indeed,
the American Bankers Association actualhv joimied (Iflier
groups this summer in urging Congress to enact leg-
ishation for a new program of guaranteed loans to
livestock producers. By acceding to requests for sub-
sidized credit, or assisting imi furthering sue-hi activities,
hamikers mnay have contributedh to the public view that
somethung is wromig ivithi our private credit allocation
system.
%~‘f’~’yi/Ni) GO.~ -4G10.TSIO’NS
In summation bankers should not remain silent on
such important subjects as political credit allocation
and bank regulation. Most bankers kmlo\v that the al-
leged problems are usually not credit problems at all,
but only tie voice of a social ideahst. The alleged
credit problem imi time cattle feedimig industry \vhiehm
led to the recent goverm’mmnent credit programn was
actually a profit problem that the market systemn will1
solve. Once price relationslnps move to profitable lev-
els, sufficient credit will be available to finance the
feeders. l’he problemn is simply made worse if aclchi—
tiomiai credit is mnade available to inefficiem’mt producers
(hiring periods of mmmifavorable puce relationslmips.
Bamikers should speak out amid resist useless govern—
nient emicroachmnemit iii this, as well mis in (Ithier areas,
includimig the variOtms alleged consumer protection
plans. Bmimikers Imave sat silent too hommg amid let other
hc’ss qualified people rtmn their hiusiness, redmmee their
mnarkets, and subsidize competitors with their profits.
In the regniatoi’v area eommfmmsiomm still pt’evamhs as to
wimich bankimig fumictions should lIe cmitroiied. b’Iemice,
time urge to protect your firms froni so-called “cut-
throat” competiton is great. It arises froni bothi cur-
remmt participants imi the markets who fear yotmr com-
petition, from the desire of regulators to regulate,
and from a large sector of the population \vmch be-
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hieves that strong. viable finamieiai firms necessary for
economic stahihity can omihy be maintained by re-
stricting their natural incemitive to compete. They as-
sociate faiiure of banks with economic depression. In
my view it is the money-creating function of banks
that has led to economic instaoihty. We can protect
the money holders thirough deposit instmrance and if
we provide for a stable rate of mnonetary growtim, the
economy wiH function satisfactorily.
I do not view an occasional ilank failure as being
disastrous. An occasional failure eliminates the ineffi-
cient and is a signal to otier firms to exercise caution.
Relatively free entry- and exit are indicators tiat an
industry is comnpetitive. Reg,uhation that is smmfflcient
to prevent new firms from enterimig and prevent
failure is sufficient to inhnhit growth and vitahty in a
competitive economy. The proposals for limiting the
rates payable on bank hoiding conipamiy credit instru-
ments are examples of a regnlation that mviii inhibit
your growth. Your success in avoiding such controls
will thus likely determirte your long-rumn growth amid
profitability.
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